Traffic Analysis Against Low-Latency Anonymity Networks Using Available Bandwidth Estimation by Chakravarty, Sambuddho et al.
Traffic Analysis Against Low-Latency
Anonymity Networks Using Available
Bandwidth Estimation?
Sambuddho Chakravarty1, Angelos Stavrou2, and Angelos D. Keromytis1
1 Columbia University, NY, USA
{sc2516,angelos}@cs.columbia.edu
2 George Mason University, VA, USA
astavrou@gmu.edu
Abstract. We introduce a novel remotely-mounted attack that can ex-
pose the network identity of an anonymous client, hidden service, and
anonymizing proxies. To achieve this, we employ single-end controlled
available bandwidth estimation tools and a colluding network entity that
can modulate the traffic destined for the victim. To expose the circuit
including the source, we inject a number of short or one large burst of
traffic. Although timing attacks have been successful against anonymity
networks, they require either a Global Adversary or the compromise of
substantial number of anonymity nodes. Our technique does not require
compromise of, or collaboration with, any such entity.
To validate our attack, we performed a series of experiments using dif-
ferent network conditions and locations for the adversaries on both con-
trolled and real-world Tor circuits. Our results demonstrate that our
attack is successful in controlled environments. In real-world scenarios,
even an under-provisioned adversary with only a few network vantage
points can, under certain conditions, successfully identify the IP address
of both Tor users and Hidden Servers. However, Tor’s inherent circuit
scheduling results in limited quality of service for its users. This at times
leads to increased false negatives and it can degrade the performance of
our circuit detection. We believe that as high speed anonymity networks
become readily available, a well-provisioned adversary, with a partial or
inferred network “map”, will be able to partially or fully expose anony-
mous users.
1 Introduction
Low-latency anonymity systems strive to protect the network identity of users
that are in need of services and applications that are latency sensitive or interac-
tive in nature. Tor [27], JAP [22] and I2P [4] are examples of popular low-latency
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anonymity systems. The Achilles’ heel of these systems lies in the fact that they
do not modify the inter-packet delay to achieve low end-to-end latency. However,
this makes them vulnerable to traffic pattern observation attacks [26]. Indeed,
the adversary can correlate flow patterns in traffic flowing through one section of
the network to that in another1. Timing attacks are feasible only by an adversary
who can observe traffic in all the network links called a Global Adversary (GA).
A key design assumption behind low-latency anonymizing systems it requires
a tremendous amount of resources and effort to become a GA. Therefore, the
goal is to provide adequate protection against all but a determined, and possibly
targeted, attack by a GA.
Recently, however, a number of practical attacks against such anonymity
systems have been proposed. These attacks typically leverage a small number
of compromised network entities to partially or fully expose information about
a user of these systems [7, 10, 20, 25, 32, 16]. Nonetheless, it is generally assumed
that consistent tracking of the users of such anonymity systems is impractical
for the large majority of users and organizations, because of the lack of many
omnipresent adversaries. We evaluate this assumption for present and future
high-speed anonymity networks.
Furthermore, popular low-latency anonymizing systems including Tor can-
not guarantee consistent quality of service. This is due to a combination of the
cryptographic computation, queuing delays, and traffic scheduling and condition-
ing [28]. Interestingly, this also degrades the adversaries ability to successfully
track the anonymous users. Having low volume of traffic causes traffic analysis
techniques to be less accurate [16]. In this paper, we study the validity of this
belief in a next-generation network and host infrastructure where the speed or
throughput of the anonymizing network is not limited by the computational or
communication capacity of the participating entities.
To that end, we present a novel and effective method for performing source
“trace-back” . Our approach can be employed to perform targeted traffic anal-
ysis against most low-latency anonymizing systems2. Contrary to the work by
Murdoch et al. on traffic analysis for Tor relays [25], our technique can track
not only the anonymizing relays, but also the victim’s network location without
the need of malicious Tor clients. We assume that the adversary controls, or can
create a traffic fluctuation, in one end of the communication channel. The ad-
versary modulates the traffic destined for the victim using a colluding end-point.
Thereby, he or she attempts to detect the artificially induced traffic variations as
they propagate over the candidate anonymizing proxies and routers, eventually
leading to the anonymous client.
To observe the induced traffic fluctuation, the attacker requires novel tools
that can quickly and accurately characterize the available bandwidth of individ-
ual links and entire network paths. We previously introduced LinkWidth [14],
1 High latency anonymity systems such as Mixminion [17] modify the inter-packet
latencies to curtail traffic analysis.
2 In our experiments, we used Tor but our approach is applicable to all proxy-based
anonymity systems
a single-end controlled available-bandwidth estimation tool that is based on the
algorithm behind TCP Westwood [18]. LinkWidth does not require a TCP lis-
tening server. Furthermore, it offers bandwidth estimation of relays and routers
connecting the victim clients (and Hidden Servers) to the anonymizing network.
We focus on using such available bandwidth estimation for sensing deliberately
induced TCP traffic fluctuations and confirming the probable identity of anony-
mous end points.
To verify the validity of our approach, we performed a series of experiments.
We evaluated the predictive accuracy of our technique on controlled environ-
ments using different network topologies. We also tested our technique on Tor
circuits created using Tor nodes that are part of the public Tor network. In our
experiments, we achieved varying success in exposing the identity of the victims.
On an average, we detected 49.3% of the Tor relays participating in our circuits.
In addition, we were also successful several times in identifying the intermedi-
ate network routers connecting Tor clients and Hidden Services to their Entry
Nodes.
We posit that a real adversary equipped with many appropriately located
high-bandwidth hosts and a partial map of the network, could effectively attack
timing-preserving anonymizing systems. Some prior efforts in generating such
maps are the Internet Mapping Project [6], AS Peering Analysis [1], iplane [23],
and similar efforts by CAIDA [2]. Searching a map depicting the ingress and
egress routers of an Autonomous System (AS) involves little complexity. An
adversary equipped with such information would probe for the induced available
bandwidth variation, only on the inter-domain routers in search for the AS that
hosts the victim anonymous client3.
The objective of this paper is not to demonstrate this search process but
to answer the following question: Can a well-provisioned (Semi-)Global Adver-
sary equipped with probing nodes scattered close to most inter-AS routers, and
“sender-only” controlled probing tools like LinkWidth, measure bandwidth fluctu-
ation on network routers and anonymizing relays associated to a communication
session?
Having a large number of distributed measurement nodes (“vantage points”)
allows for better coverage of the network links. However, there is no requirement
for network affinity of the vantage points to the victim or the Tor relays used in
the circuit. Moreover, we do not assume that the attacker has access to routers,
network infrastructure nodes (e.g., DNS or DHCP servers), or anonymizing re-
lays; nor do we exploit software vulnerabilities that inadvertently expose the
true network identity of the user. The novelty of our technique lies in aiding
an adversary with bandwidth resources to perform traffic analysis for determin-
ing anonymizing network’s entry-points, anonymous clients and location hidden
services in a communication session.
3 Further, resolving down to the end hosts might require ISP router maps through
services such as as Rocketfuel [5]
2 Related Work
The majority of the attacks against low-latency anonymization systems, employ
some form of traffic analysis. Many of the successful methods apply active tech-
niques, employing practical predecessor attack [34] derivatives like [30, 9, 35, 16],
which involve inside network elements. Other suggest passive attacks that sim-
ply count the number of packets at ingress and egress links of the anonymizing
network [8].
There are yet some other attacks which try to track changes in non-anonymous
system parameters (e.g. CPU and memory usage) in network nodes due to
change in anonymous traffic flowing through them. Such attacks are called side
channel attacks. Some examples of side channel attacks are presented in refer-
ences [36, 24]. Here the adversary observes changes in CPU usage by observing
skews in TCP timestamps, that are brought about by changes in CPU tem-
perature. Other such attacks use network latency as a side-channel to reveal
identity of anonymous network system parameters [20, 25]. The authors of those
papers demonstrate the use of inter-packet latency and round-trip times (RTT)
to reveal identity of anonymous peers and anonymizing network elements.
Although significant, this class of attacks can be ineffective when the bottle-
necks of the network paths connecting the anonymously communicating peers
and the adversary to the candidate networking elements, do not coincide. In
such situations, the adversary’s measurement capabilities, constrained by the
bottleneck link speed, might not accurately detect network link contentions due
to the anonymous traffic. Such contentions are essential to perceive changes in
the measured RTT. The poor end-to-end QoS of popular systems such as Tor,
further degrades the attacker’s ability to launch such attacks. Low volume traffic
leads to low network congestion; thereby causing little variations in measured
RTT between the adversary and the victim. Results by Evans et al. indicate that
this intuition is likely correct [16].
Our approach stems out of RTT based traffic analysis [25, 20], and par-
tially from traffic pattern injection techniques [31, 21]. Unlike predecessor at-
tack derivatives, our attack assumes nominal control of networking elements.
The adversary induces end-to-end network traffic fluctuation by colluding with
a malicious server with which anonymous clients communicate. Using Linkwidth,
the adversary tries to observe the induced bandwidth fluctuations on candidate
anonymizing network elements and routers leading to the anonymous client.
Our approach seems similar to targeted denial of service based technique,
presented by Burch and Cheswick to “trace-back” to the source of a DoS source
that used IP spoofing [11]. Their aim was to cause interference in the remote
routers and notice fluctuations in the attack-DoS traffic. Using a network map
they would iteratively trace-back to eventually identify the source of a DoS, or
at least its approximate location (e.g., hosting ISP). Our technique is similar
to theirs. We, however, aim to “trace” available bandwidth fluctuations on net-
work routers and anonymizing proxies that carry traffic between the anonymous
parties.
3 Attack Methodology
Before delving into the attack details, we discuss the threat model for which we
claim that our attacks are effective.
Threat Model
Our primary focus is an adversary who can induce “traffic fluctuations” into
a targeted anonymity preserving channel and observe it “trickle” towards the
victim. The adversary may have hosts under his control on many ASes or could
be at a network vantage point with respect to routers in various subnets. Each
of these hosts may be running a copy of bandwidth estimation tools such as
LinkWidth. They would also be at a network vantage point with respect to all
candidate victim relays and network routers. This is feasible in toady’s’ Internet:
the inter-router media connecting the routers of major tier-3 ISPs can support
over 10 Gbps (let alone the tier-1 and tier-2 ISPs). Most have 30–40% under-
utilized spare capacity. Therefore, while we are not in a position of having a
large set of vantage points, this does not prevent others from being able to do
so. Often, adversaries like us, might be sensing “under-utilized high-bandwidth”
links. Popular anonymity preserving systems, like Tor relays, often dedicate a
considerable fraction of the traffic to forwarding client traffic. However, such
small fluctuations in high capacity links, are less than what most state-of-the-
art available link bandwidth estimation techniques can detect accurately. Never-
theless, we demonstrate that for some common network topology configurations
and parameters, an adversary can harness bandwidth estimation to trace the
“unknown” path a client uses to connect to a server.
Traffic Analysis Methodology
We used available bandwidth estimation tools to detect induced traffic fluctua-
tions on candidate anonymizing relays. We identify probable candidate network
routers that could reach this relay through a single network hop. Since most
anonymity preserving relays are at the network edges, the network routers that
could directly reach the candidate relays would be their default gateways. This
intuition was re-applied on default gateways to determine which network inter-
face, and hence the network routers within one network hop, exhibited similar
fluctuations. We repeated the tracking process recursively until the fluctuations
were tracked down to the source network (and possibly the source itself).
To quantify our detection capabilities, we performed extensive experiments
initially in a controlled emulation environments, viz. DETER [3]. Some of the
experiments were further validated in controlled lab-environment. We also un-
covered real-world Tor clients, and hidden servers which communicated using
public Tor relays, with some success. Our approach requires a “map” presenting
with information of inter-domain routers for the Tor Entry Node and the victim.
In our experiments, we did not use elaborate maps. We only considered result

























































Fig. 1. DETER testbed network topology.
Node. Moderate success rate is primarily due to a combination of our inadequate
network vantage points and low end-to-end throughput offered by the Tor relays
as compared to the available link capacities of routers and relays. Lastly, our
accuracy was also affected by the presence of background cross traffic on regular
network routers, resulting in higher false negatives when compared to the in-lab
or DETERLAB experiments’ results.
4 Experimental Evaluation
Our attack technique can be applied to low-latency anonymity systems that are
based on Onion Routing [19]. Tor is a good example and chief among onion
routing anonymizing based systems. In such systems, there seems to be a trade-
off between anonymity guarantees and performance [28]. We show that in both
controlled and real-world experiments, a well-provisioned adversary can expose
the anonymity of Tor relays and end-points. This is performed by determining
the available bandwidth fluctuations on a large number of relays and network
routers.
4.1 Experiments Using the DETER Testbed
To determine the effectiveness of our attack, we used DETER [3] to emulate var-
ious network topologies. DETER is a network emulation system that offers com-
modity machines and switches connected with user specified topologies. Users
can specify the operating systems, network connections, link speeds, routing pro-
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Available Bandwidth Variation on router3
"router3-link-measure"
Fig. 2. The detected available bandwidth on
the router connected to the victim router3
drops uniformly as client traffic increases.
Figure 1 depicts one of the
topologies we used to validate our
approach. In these experiments,
we used Iperf [29] and LinkWidth
to detect the fluctuation of the
available link bandwidth on net-
work routers along the path con-
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Available Bandwidth Variation on router5
"router5-link-measure"
Fig. 3. We correctly measured the absence
of consistent available bandwidth fluctua-
tion on router5 (not in the victim’s path).
The host, marked as server
in the topology figure (Figure 1),
was the colluding web server. In
addition, there were two client
hosts, client1 and client2.
client1 was the victim down-
loaded a large file from server,
using HTTP; client2 was idle.
With two clients on two sepa-
rate branches, the available traf-
fic fluctuation induced by server
was observable only by one of
the branches (the one leading to
client1). The probing hosts on
each of the subnets probe the
intermediate links. To forward
packets through proxy1, we used
squid [33]. client1 connected to
server via proxy1. The server
modulated the transmission rate
to induce the necessary bandwidth fluctuation. The adversary probed for the
bandwidth variation on the network elements in both branches using its probing
hosts.
The reason we avoided installing an anonymizing system in this particular
experiment is due to the poor QoS resulting from computational and network
transport costs in systems like Tor. The motivation behind choosing squid was
to demonstrate the effectiveness of our hypothesis; we assume that the relay-
ing architecture of Onion Routing based systems would soon provide higher
throughput rate like unencrypted squid proxy.
Therefore, the goal of the experiment was to demonstrate that an adversary
can observe these induced traffic fluctuations, provided the anonymizing service
does not degrade client–server traffic throughput.
5 Due to the way DETER emulates the requested link capacities and the use of traf-

































Fig. 4. In-Lab testbed network topology.
While the download was in progress, the server increased the transmission
speed gradually by 50 Mbps, 100 Mbps, 200 Mbps, 300 Mbps and 500 Mbps, for
every iteration of the experiment. The probing nodes (probers) measured the
available bandwidth variation on both branches. The available link bandwidth
fell steadily on all routers along the path carrying client1’s traffic. The probing
of router5 and client2, along the idle network branch, resulted in very high
true negatives. For brevity, we only present the results obtained by probing
router3 and router5. The graphs representing these are presented in Figures 2
and 3. The graphs that show the fluctuations in available bandwidth for the rest
of the hosts are presented in Appendix A.
The available bandwidth drops as the server increases its rate to the victim,
and thus occupies greater share of the available bandwidth along the path via
router3. Probing router5 along the path connecting client2 to server shows
no significant fluctuation in available bandwidth. Overall, our experiments indi-
cate that we can indeed detect small fluctuations by utilizing about 5–10% of the
link bandwidth. Although this is a large value (approximately 50–100 Mbps), it
is only a small fraction of the link bandwidth. This encouraged us to believe,
that our technique will work well even in situations where only a small portion
of the network link is being utilized by anonymous traffic.
We used a large file for our experiments. But we could have achieved the
same fluctuation through multiple downloads of many small files. Through co-
ordinated probing of the candidate links, momentary burst (due to small files
being downloaded) can be easily detected. This is clearly evident from our results
presented in Appendix A. The sudden fall in available link bandwidth from
approximately 100% (900 Mbps) to 90% (800 Mbps) within a short interval (few
seconds) and and sudden rise later to 100%, in tandem to the induced traffic
fluctuations, proves this. Further evidence of LinkWidth’s effectiveness to detect
small bandwidth fluctuations is presented in in our technical report [14].
4.2 In-Lab Experiments
To further support the DETER results, we performed the same experiments
in an in-lab environment using commodity machines connected via a Gigabit
switched network. Figure 4 depicts the in-lab network testbed topology used
to demonstrate our technique. Again, the client client1 is the victim and is
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Available Bandwidth Variation on hop3
"measure-link"
Fig. 5. Available bandwidth on hop3
drops uniformly when we increase the
traffic towards the victim.
As before, the client downloaded
a large file and the server varied
the TCP throughput. The probing
hosts measured the available band-
width on the routers along both
branches of the network - one lead-
ing to client1, which downloads the
file, and the other leading to client2,
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Available Bandwidth Variation on hop5
"falsepath-measure-link"
Fig. 6. There is no persistent available
bandwidth fluctuation on hop5 (unlike
hop3, that is along path of the download
traffic).
Available bandwidth on all the
routers along the path connecting
client1 to server fluctuated, as
server varied the available TCP traf-
fic to port 80, that it saw originat-
ing from the host relaysdirs. For
brevity, we present graphically the re-
sults from probing hop3 (Figure 5),
along the path leading to the victim
and hop5 (Figure 6), leading to the
idle node.
We observed reduction in avail-
able bandwidth as client-server traffic
eventually occupies more bandwidth
along the path via hop3. The available
link bandwidth of hop5 does not show
any drastic change, as it was not along
the actual download path. Probing
router hop3 and client1 also showed
similar bandwidth fluctuations while
hop6 and client2 showed no definite
fall in the available the link band-
width; thus concurring with our idea of tracking link bandwidth fluctuation
along the path leading up to the actual source of traffic. These results are pre-
sented in Appendix B.
4.3 Probing Tor Relays, Clients and Hidden Services
The validation of our technique in previous subsections, albeit on a controlled
environment, encouraged us to believe that our technique might potentially be
used to track induced available bandwidth on network routers connecting a Tor
client to a Tor Entry Node. Therefore, we attempted to identify the Tor Onion
Routers (ORs) participating in a real-world circuit. The server colluded with the
adversary to induce fluctuations in the circuit throughput. This resulted in avail-
able bandwidth fluctuation on ORs and network routers connecting these ORs to
Onion Proxies (OPs)6. This experiment is elaborated in our previous paper [13].
We concisely describe the experiment and results here. Figure 7 illustrates how
the adversary probed the Tor relays involved in a circuit.
Fig. 7. Adversary probing the fluctuations in available bandwidth of ORs participating
in a Tor circuit.
The colluding web server transmitted a file which the client downloaded the
file through a Tor circuit. During the download, the adversary used our traf-
fic analysis technique to identify the victim relays participating in the circuit.
While the server shaped the circuit’s throughput to various values, the adversary
measured the available bandwidth using LinkWidth. This process was repeated
several times. In every iteration, the adversary changed the client’s bandwidth
share, increasing it each time by approximately 100 Kbps. The adversary de-
tected decrease in measured available bandwidth that was reflected through
increase in congestion and packet losses.
In our experiments, we successfully identified all the relay nodes in 11 out of
the 50 circuits that we probed. For 14 circuits, we were able to identify only two of
the three participating Tor relays. There were 12 circuits in which only one of the
relays was detected. There were also 13 circuits that we are unable to detect any
of the participating ORs. Finally, among all the 150 ORs probed there were 22
which filtered all probe traffic. A similar experiment was performed for obtaining
6 Onion Proxy is the term used for Tor clients [15]
an estimate of the false positives. Initial observations yielded approximately
10% false positives. However, on repeated iterations of the same experiment, we
detected no false positives. These very likely result from noises and errors in our
measurement techniques resulting from lack of adequate network vantage hosts,
background network cross-traffic and asymmetric network links.
Probe Set-up and Technique for Identifying Tor Clients: To determine
the network identities of Tor clients involved in Tor circuits, we used the same
setup as in Figure 7. However, in this experiment, the adversary probed routers
on the network path connecting the Tor Entry Nodes to the Tor Clients. The
client fetched a relatively large file from a colluding server, which shaped the
bandwidth of the connection.
Circuit Hops from Client Correctly Detected Unresponsive Routers Not Success
Number –Entry Node Client–Entry Routers Reporting Rate
Node Node Hops Enough
Fluctuations
1 10 6 4 0 60.00%
2 15 4 0 0 26.67%
3 18 4 7 7 22.23%
4 18 5 8 5 27.78%
5 14 6 2 6 42.86%
6 14 9 1 4 64.30%
7 15 7 2 6 46.67%
8 14 7 2 5 50.00%
9 14 4 2 8 28.57%
10 15 6 4 5 40.00%
Table 1. Available-Bandwidth Fluctuation Detection in Links Connecting a Tor Client
and its Entry Node.
Lacking a “network map” that has link-level connectivity information of the
Internet, we relied on traceroute information to discover the hops between the
client and its Entry Node. However, in practice, an adversary equipped with AS-
to-AS and link-level network connectivity maps, needs to probe only a relatively
small set of links to determine which of them might be carrying the victim’s
traffic. Entry and exit, to and from an AS, is through a small number of inter-
domain routers. The adversary can look up the AS location of the Tor relays
from the inter-domain routing information. This will enable him to track the
induced available bandwidth variation only on inter-domains routers and search
for the AS that hosts the victim anonymous client. Nodes in all the probable
ASes, with link speeds comparable to that of the inter-domain routers’, could be
used for this task. To obtain higher fine-grained network position, the attacker
might have to track down to the end hosts. This step will require ISP router
maps through services such as as Rocketfuel [5]. Though seemingly an exponential
search problem, this would be reasonably tractable provided the fluctuations could
be detected with high confidence. Moreover, optimizing the adversary’s search of
links to probe is a different problem and we do not consider that aspect of the
attack in this paper.
The results from probing the available link bandwidth variations on net-
work routers connecting the clients to their respective Entry Nodes, is presented
in Table 1. The accurate detection of bandwidth fluctuation was performed
through the detection of packet loss changes. This loss is indication of decrease
in available bandwidth, whenever the routers and Tor relays were probed using
LinkWidth. Our technique used an un-cooperative method of available band-
width or throughput estimation. Sometimes the probe traffic, being aggressive,
prevented a Tor client, using TCP (which is “elastic” and non-aggressive), to
utilize all of the allowed bandwidth. This lead to an “on-off” pattern in the
the client’s download. This is particularly true when the probes and the probed
traffic traverse the same victim router.
Fig. 8. The adversary measures the available bandwidth and thus detects any fluctu-
ations in each link of the path leading to the victim.
As a caveat, modifying the available throughput of the TCP connection
through a certain repeating pattern (e.g., 50 Kbps, 100 Kbps, 500 Kbps, 50
Kbps, 100 Kbps, 500 Kbps), would be akin to inducing a distinct “signal” or “wa-
termark” in the client-server traffic. If very high true positives are assured, then
this “signal” could be detected always and only on relays and routers through
which the victim’s traffic travels7. This can optimize the search for links to probe
while determining the source of the anonymous traffic8.
Probe Set-up and Technique for Identifying Tor Hidden Servers: To
identify a Hidden Service, we used the setup depicted in Figure 8. Here the ad-
versary probed the routers connecting Hidden Service to its Entry Node. Con-
7 Thereby also eliminating false positives and false negatives.
8 Without such an optimization, the adversary might end up performing a depth-first
search of large segments of the Internet rooted at the Tor entry node
trary to the previous cases, the available bandwidth fluctuation was induced
by the client which is assumed to collude with the adversary. We relied solely
on traceroute for determining which routers connect a Hidden Server to its
corresponding Entry Node. Table 2 summarizes the results of this experiment:
Circuit Hops from Hidden Correctly Detected Unresponsive Routers Not Success
Number Server–Entry Hidden Server–Entry Routers Reporting Rate
Node Node Hops Enough
Fluctuations
1 13 4 2 7 30.70%
2 12 9 0 3 75.00%
3 11 7 1 3 63.64%
4 14 5 4 5 35.71%
5 12 9 0 3 75.00%
6 13 3 3 7 23.08%
7 16 5 4 7 31.25%
8 13 3 2 8 23.08%
9 17 4 1 12 23.53%
10 13 5 1 7 38.46%
Table 2. Available-Bandwidth Fluctuation Detection in Links Connecting a Hidden
Server to Its Entry Nodes
In almost every circuit, there were some routers which filtered our probe
packets. The rest of the routers were either detected correctly or not detected
at all (i.e., no false positives). This can be attributed to the lack of sufficient
vantage points or to insufficient throughput achieved by the client in some cases
(approximately 5–10 KBytes/sec). Despite of these practical problems, we were
still able to trace the bandwidth fluctuations along the path (and hence the
identity) of the Tor client and Hidden Server with high accuracy; over 60% and
75% in some of the circuits. The observed degradation in the client’s performance
whenever the adversary probed the candidate routers, are accepted as “available
bandwidth fluctuations”. Placing a large number of probing hosts at network
vantage points would provide the adversary with better detection resolution and
accuracy.
5 Issues, Discussion and Possible Counter-Measures
We initially tested our trace-back technique under various controlled environ-
ments. Our results indicate high true positives and almost zero false negatives.
Small bandwidth variations, due to the introduction of a 50–100 Mbps TCP
stream, were clearly discernible on a 1 Gbps link. This led us to believe that
small bandwidth fluctuations on high-capacity links can be detected provided
there is low background cross traffic that may introduce false positives or false
negatives in the measurements.
LinkWidth provides very accurate available link bandwidth estimation. As
presented in our technical report [14], LinkWidth can accurately detect 1 Kbps
fluctuation in available link bandwidth. Of course, this accuracy decreases when
the variations decrease as a percentage of the overall link capacity. Small distor-
tions, for instance 50 Kbps, on a 500 Kbps are easier to detect, than when they
are on a 1 Gbps link.
Simple fluctuations on network links of the in-lab testbed could be detected
within 15-20 seconds. The probing speeds were adjustable run-time parame-
ters. Faster probing caused greater contention to the client-server traffic, thereby
slightly decreasing the detection accuracy and granularity.
Having obtained high true positives under controlled environments, it seemed
intuitive that an adversary could potentially detect available bandwidth fluctu-
ation on an anonymizing proxy and its propagation to corresponding clients or
servers via network routers. It is important that adversarial nodes are located
at network vantage points where they can filter out traffic that causes unwanted
distortion to the probes. It is also essential that a Tor client achieves high end-
to-end throughput through Tor relays which is comparable to the installed link
capacity of the network routers.
When applied to detect available link bandwidth variations on real Tor ORs,
we were able to detect with some success, fluctuations on network routers con-
necting the client to its respective ORs. However, we restricted our selection of
Tor relays within the US, to position our US-based probing host at a better
network vantage point, when probing Tor relays. Probing nodes residing across
trans-oceanic links seems infeasible and provided erratic results. Consequently,
we were limited by the number of Exit Nodes within the US. Out of the ap-
proximately 150 exit relays at the time of our experiments less than 100 allow
clients to setup their own circuits. Moreover, less than a fifth of these allow
Hidden Servers to communicate with anonymous clients. This is mostly due to
intermittent quality of service, node availability, and exit policies that restricted
connectivity to a small set of permitted users. Probing Tor relays and network
routers required considerably more measurements than the in-lab measurements
(approximately 2-5 minutes per relay or router). High Internet cross-traffic and
low Tor traffic necessitates longer probing and more measurements to avoid false
positives and false negatives as much as possible.
In real world scenarios, there maybe various ways to entice a Tor client to
connect to such malicious servers. Tempting commercials on a website, luring a
Tor client to click on, could be one such tactic. This could download applications,
like multiple Adobe Flash animations, on the client’s host, resulting in a sud-
den change in his/her available network link bandwidth. An adversary running
multiple co-ordinated probing hosts, probing suspected links, could detect such
a sudden sharp change in available link bandwidths on all links connecting the
anonymous party to its anonymizing service; thereby revealing its identity. The
adversary would require to own only a frame of a popular website, say a blog or
an online forum, visited frequently by users who wish to stay anonymous.
Apart from the lack of accuracy in detecting small variations of available link
bandwidth, Reardon and Goldberg have described why current Tor circuits offer
low end-to-end throughput [28]. This is primarily because of multiplexing many
TCP streams through a single Tor circuit connecting a Tor client to a relay or
between the relays themselves, if such circuits already exist. Therefore, TCP
congestion control and flow control mechanics affect the performance of all Tor
circuits that are multiplexed over a single TCP connection. Packet losses and
reordering affecting the cells of one Tor circuit reduced the overall performance
of the TCP connection. Such losses cause the cells from unrelated Tor circuits
to be delayed as well.
These inherent measurement limitations can be potentially leveraged to cre-
ate countermeasures or even narrow the applicability of our attack. For instance,
an anonymous client can utilize parallel connections in a round-robin fashion to
access the same server. This would diffuse the ability of the server to generate
detectable traffic variations: traffic spikes would be distributed across all the par-
allel connections. Likewise, traffic smoothing by anonymizing proxies is another
potential countermeasure. Tor allows relay operators to use such techniques.
Another option is to use shorter circuit lifetime. This would impose some time
limitations on the duration of the communication path, making it harder for
an adversary to completely trace the target through the anonymizing network.
Anonymous connections using longer paths by employing more relays do not ap-
pear to make the attack appreciably more difficult. However, as discussed in [12],
it can significantly affect the client’s perception of the connection throughput.
6 Conclusions
We proposed a new traffic analysis technique that can expose the network iden-
tity of end-points (users) of low-latency network anonymity systems. Our tech-
nique involves an adversary who can probe links from many network vantage
points using single-end controlled bandwidth estimation tools. In addition, the
adversary employs a colluding server or is able to otherwise induce fluctuations
in the victim’s TCP connection. It is not essential to own such colluding servers:
using carefully crafted online ads and pop-ups can be used judiciously to trick
users to click on specific links and result in traffic spikes. Using the vantage
points, the adversary measures the effects of this fluctuation as it “trickles”
through the anonymizing relays and intermediate routers to the victim.
Our approach works well when the end-to-end throughput of the anonymizing
network allows for bandwidth variations that can be detected by the vantage
points. This motivated us to test our attack technique in real-world Tor circuits.
Our experiments show that we were able to expose real-world Tor relays with a
true positive rate of 49.3%. Furthermore, we can successfully traceback to the Tor
clients and Hidden Servers by probing the network routers connecting them to
their Entry Nodes. On average, we could correlate 49.5% of the network routers
to the victim Tor traffic that they carried. Further correlations were not always
feasible due to bandwidth limitations imposed by relay operators and Tor’s poor
performance owing to circuit scheduling and management [28]. We believe that
our work exposes a real weakness in proxy-based anonymity schemes. This threat
will become increasingly more apparent and accurate as future networks and hosts
participate in higher end-to-end throughput circuits.
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APPENDIX
A Results from Probing Host/Routers on DETER
Testbed
This section presents the results omitted in subsection 4.1. The graph in Fig-
ure 9(a) exhibits the results from probing the network interface of client1. As
expected, we observe a very similar visible available bandwidth fluctuation pat-
tern as we saw in Figure 5 for router3. Also evident from results in Figure 9(b),
we don’t observe any obvious induced available bandwidth variations when the

























Available Bandwidth Variation on client1
"client1-link-measure"
(a) Available bandwidth on client1 varies


























Available Bandwidth Variation on client2
"client2-link-measure"
(b) Available bandwidth on client2 doesn’t
vary like that on network entities along the
actual download path
Fig. 9. Available Bandwidth Variation on client1 and client2 of DETERLAB
testbed
B Results from Probing Host/Routers on Lab Test-bed
All of the results obtained from probing for available bandwidth variation of the
network entities were not presented in subsection 4.2. For the sake of complete-
ness, we present the remainder of the results here in Figures 10 and 11
The results in Figures 10(a) and 10(b) are along the path which carries the
download traffic. The plots in Figures 11(a) and 11(b) are for hosts that do


























Available Bandwidth Variation on hop4
"measure-link"
(a) Available bandwidth variation on hop4


























Available Bandwidth Variation on client1
"measure-link"
(b) Available bandwidth on client1 varies
much like hop3 and hop4,as the download rate
changes


























Available Bandwidth Variation on hop6
"falsepath-measure-link"
(a) No uniform available bandwidth variation

























Available Bandwidth Variation on client2
"falsepath-measure-link"
(b) Absense of the uniform available band-
width variation that is observed on the actual
source (client1)
Fig. 11. Available Bandwidth on Routers and End Hosts of the In-Lab Network Not
Along the Download Path
